I. Introduction
At Moody's one analyst recalls rating a $1 billion structured deal in 90 minutes. 'People at the rating agencies used to say things like, "I can't believe that we got comfortable with that deal,"' says Raynes [an individual employed by Moody's in the 1990s]. 1 Hand in hand with this situation went analysts' hope to be 'wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters' because the CDO market appeared as a 'monster'. 2 These quotes only give a slight idea of how bad a job the rating agencies did throughout the crisis, which resulted in quite a few lawsuits afterwards. 3 At the same time, Fitch
Investor Services insists that 'credit ratings, as opinions on relative ranking of vulnerability to default, do not imply or convey a specific statistical probability of default' 4 .
With the agencies' ratings moving to the centre of the debate in the current sovereign debt crisis and the repercussions of wrong downgrades becoming greater, 5 the liability issue is subject to an unprecedentedly intense regulatory debate in the rating industry.
Only recently the European Commission has put forward a proposal for a regulation Regulation introducing civil liability of credit rating agencies has been one of the most controversial provisions of the amendment. In order to arrive at an independent evaluation of this liability rule, one first has to take a look at the existing rules on civil 
II. Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in a Comparative
Perspective A. Contractual Liability In the European Member States there is no specific legislation governing contracts between issuers and credit rating agencies, so that the general rules of contract law will apply in full. As a result, one has to overcome some major obstacles in order to hold rating agencies liable for breach of contract. First of all, for the most relevant scenario of an investor claiming damages he suffered from a flawed rating there is no immediate contractual relation between him and the potential addressee of such a contractual claim, i.e. the rating agency rating the issue in question. As far as any contractual claim of the issuer against the credit rating agency is concerned, the underlying contracts always include an exclusion of liability in favour of the agency. Only under the French Loi de regulation bancaire et financière ('Law regulating banking and finance' or 'RBF Act') 6 , enacted on October 23, 2010, these contractual clauses will be deemed null and void. 7 In light of these hurdles, one has to draw on specific doctrinal exceptions in order to lay a basis for a contractual claim.
B. Implicit Agreement in Favour of a Third Party
Under German law the debate on contractual liability of rating agencies centres on the potential existence of an implicit agreement between the issuer and the rating agency so as to protect the investors as third parties. The prevailing doctrine states certain requirements that have to be met in order to be able to rely on such a contractually based claim, so that the potential range of those potentially liable in contract does not grow to an unreasonable extent. That is why the claimant of such a contractual claim 6 Loi n° 2010-1249 du 22 octobre 2010 de régulation bancaire et financière, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=D180F17E5A1D3FA8F1211F195C5004F6.tpdj o09v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022940663&categorieLien=id#JORFSCTA000022940671 (accessed 30 May 2013). 7 Art. L. 544-6. -Les clauses qui visent à exclure la responsabilité des agences de notation de crédit mentionnées à l'article L. 544-4 sont interdites et réputées non écrites.
has to find him-/herself in a creditor like position. In the case of the rating agencies the rating aims at the capital market and the investor, who is supposed to take it into account for his investment decision. At the same time, however, the interests of the investor and the issuer are not aligned. Whereas the issuer is interested in the highest possible rating, the investor would prefer a lower rating in the interest of a cheaper entry-level price. Therefore, the contractual conceptualization of the underlying relationships may seem a little far-fetched from a doctrinal point of view.
Hand in hand with this interest analysis goes a second requirement for a claim based on an implicit agreement in favour of the investor that seems problematic, that is the investor's specific vulnerability. Such a vulnerability is absent in the presence of another potentially liable party. In the case of investor losses it is generally the issuer who is insolvent and unable to satisfy his/her investors' claims. If now the investor can have recourse to the rating agency, there is no denying the fact that there is a danger that the insolvency risk is shifted to the rating agency. 
C.
Quasi-contractual Liability
1.
Special Expertise and Causation as a Basis for Liability under German Law Without a contractually based relationship between the rating agency and the investor, the role of the rating agency as an expert in the capital market enters into play as a circumstance possibly constituting the basis for quasi-contractual liability. Under German law § 311 para. 3 sent. 2 of the German Civil Code explicitly states someone's liability, if he or she inspires confidence, thus favourably influencing contract negotiations or the conclusion of a contract. In its narrow sense, the legal definition of the pre-contractual liability under § 311 para. 3 sent. 2 of the German Civil Code suggests some immediate contact between the party held liable and the claimant.
According to the German case law on the legal liability for statements in the prospectus such a specific basis for investors' typical reliance on the misstatements is even required for liability in this more common scenario.
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That is why one would have to state the factual requirements for the liability of credit rating agencies more loosely and primarily base it on the intermediary function of rating agencies as gatekeepers of the capital market. 10 24 In order to avoid liability, rating agencies generally argued to be members of the press. 25 Therefore ratings had to be looked at as opinions to be protected under a heightened malice standard. 26 Despite this general protection, recently after the financial crisis there were unsuccessful attempts to raise this defence, when the agency was found to have been an active participant in structuring the proposed transaction 27 or to have been subject to conflicts of interest resulting from this role or from the fee structure underlying this issue and amounting to a contingent fee and the resulting improper motivation. 28 In the latter case the rating was only paid if the rating was actually used in the offering.
In light of these obstacles to plaintiffs bringing suits against credit rating agencies, in the aftermath of the financial crisis the US legislator introduced a private cause of action in the Dodd-Frank Act under which investors can sue credit rating agencies for knowingly or recklessly failing to conduct a reasonable investigation of facts or for failing to obtain an analysis from an independent source. 29 The implementation of this newly created liability turned out to be difficult and the repeal does not have the previously hoped for effect as regulatory behaviour control.
The major rating agencies refused to have their ratings included in registration statements, so that issuers were unable to include them in their registration statements as prescribed by Regulation AB. 31 A virtual standstill in the market for asset-backed securities resulted. 32 As a consequence, the SEC found itself forced to release a noaction letter to avoid enforcement actions so long as the amendment could not be effectively implemented on July 22, 2010, which was to be applied until January 24,
2011. But even after that date, there has not been any evidence of activities of the SEC to bring enforcement practices in line with the newly introduced expert liability of rating agencies as provided for after the repeal of Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act, despite some officials', such as Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley's pushing towards enforcement. 33 As a consequence of the no-action letter, on the one hand, it is true that the probability of SEC action has decreased, without however altering the technical requirements of Regulation AB. Therefore issuers who do not include ratings in their registration statement in reliance on the SEC's no-action letter may be subject to investor claims of noncompliance with Regulation AB. As a result, the repeal of Rule 436(g) has created a dilemma in the sense that it results in either party's liability, depending on whether the ratings are included or not, without actually clarifying the crucial issues of the liability problem. In the long run, it may even go so far as to make issuers rely on private placements, to which Rule 144A of the Securities As it has been common in the liability cases in the US, Standard & Poor's again referred to the disclaimers in the pre-sale and post-sale reports asserting that a rating is a statement of opinion. 37 Justice Jayne Jagot, however, refused to bring to bear the protection of the freedom of expression, so that rating agencies would be able to escape liability, distinguishing between this case and the relevant US case law, thus laying a basis for holding Standard & Poor's liable for misrepresenting that its rating was based on reasonable grounds and the product of the exercise of reasonable care. The main issue about the negligence claim also raised against Standard & Poor's was the question whether the rating agency owed a duty of care to potential buyers of the Rembrandt notes. 41 Similarly to the argument made in the context of the privity of contract mentioned above, the Australian judge focuses on the primary goal of the issuer, which is to obtain the rating for communication purposes with regard to the investors as a basis for the latter's investment decisions. 42 In contrast to the case law in the different member states cited above, as for the necessary causation the Australian court considered it sufficient to show that the triple-A rating was one of two principal reasons for the councils' agreement to invest in the Rembrandt notes besides the LGFS' recommendation.
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Looking at the overall perspective of the court in this case and the standard of proof that seems to be lower than in the cases above, there is some indication that the reasoning may imply certain parallels to product liability law. 44 rating was defective, they were foreseeable third-party users, and they were harmed by these defective products. They were able to prove the defect of the ratings by simply
showing that modelling inputs and underlying assumptions did not meet the necessary standard, and the proof of the exercise of due care and skill was lying with Standard & Poor's. Against this background, bringing to bear the legal framework of product liability, it appeared reasonable for the court to determine that the ratings were harmful defective products and therefore hold Standard & Poor's strictly liable for the ratings.
The finding of actually misleading and deceptive conduct can only play a role in the sense that it may cap liability, when the defendant proves that such conduct is missing.
In summary, in Bathurst Regional Council v. Local Government Financial Services Pty
Ltd the Federal Court of Australia has overcome well-known hurdles to lay a legal foundation for the civil liability of rating agencies, so that more litigation and new actions can be expected to follow this landmark decision not only in Australia, but at least in those countries where this type of products was misrated as well. 45 Only on As a starting point, under Article 35a para. 1 of the Draft Proposal any 'infringement… listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating on which an investor has relied when purchasing a rated instrument' will be suitable to trigger liability of the 'credit rating agency for any damage caused to the investor'. 50 Without more these requirements do not necessarily facilitate the pursuit of legal remedies for investors because the investor is entitled to damages, only if the infringement has had an impact on the rating and he/she has relied on this rating and there has been causation between the infringement and the investor's damages (Article 35a para. 1 of the Draft Proposal).
III. Procedural Facilitation as a Basis for Liability in
As has become apparent at the example of the different legal systems looked at above, these additional requirements have proved to be serious obstacles to rating agencies' liability. That is why the procedural facilitation that was included in Article 35a paras 2-4 of the Draft Proposal turns to be the actual trigger of liability.
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What is most important is the shift in the burden of proof according to Article 35a para.
4, so that it is sufficient for the investor to establish 'facts from which it may be inferred that a credit rating agency has committed any of the infringements' and the burden is on the credit rating agency to prove that it has not committed that infringement or that that infringement did not have an impact on the issued credit rating". At the bottom line, under this provision rating agencies have to provide proof of the flawlessness of their ratings, eventually putting them under pressure to disclose their methods and modeling inputs. 52 . This is very much at odds with the limits of disclosure duties as stated in the EU Rating Regulation of 2009, which should not jeopardize trade secrets nor impede innovation. 53 Such a disclosure might eliminate competition for the best rating methods, 54 thus thwarting the desired goal of the European Commission to strengthen competition and revealing the structural problems in the rating sector. 55 What is even more detrimental to competition, when it comes to the implementation of such a farreaching liability rule, is its potential deterring effect on market entry of new competitors, who will shy away from these high liability risks. In addition, far-reaching liability will have a chilling effect on capital markets because, as has been seen in the aftermath of the passage of Dodd-Frank and the expert liability imposed on rating agencies, the latter may be reluctant to rate some financial instruments at all. 56 Looking at the reversal of the burden of proof more generally, in light of the complexity of the rating regulations, an investor will always find some questionable practice to exploit as an infringement, and under the Draft Proposal the rating agencies would then have to carry the burden of proof to establish their innocence.
B. Amendments by the Council of the European Union and by the European Parliament

1.
The General Approach of the Council of the European Union Therefore it comes as no surprise that this stringent liability rule has encountered incisive criticism not only from interest-groups, but also from the other European institutions involved in the legislative process, which have therefore presented alternative amendments. In its general approach on the subject of the Draft Proposal of May 25, 2012 the European Council provided for a considerable alleviation of the liability rule conceived by the European Commission in the Draft Proposal. 57 In effect, the general approach does away with the reversal of the burden of proof, so that under this approach damages may be claimed only if the investor or issuer establishes an infringement intentionally or grossly negligently committed by an agency that has an impact on a rating, reasonable reliance on that rating for an investment decision and causation between the infringement and the damages suffered by him. 58 
IV. Main Parameters of an Effective Liability Rule in the Rating
Sector
In light of the dangers of an excessive liability of rating agencies to the capital markets and companies' ability to raise capital, some careful analysis seems to be in order as to 70 For similar concerns about potential consequences of fragmentation of European supervision cf. whether such a manipulation with capital markets eliminates more serious distortions resulting from flawed ratings.
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A. Excessive Liability Versus Immunity -The Causation Issue
1.
Dangers of Excessive Liability Talking about market mechanisms, with regard to investors the point of departure of the analysis is the benefit the latter receive from ratings without payment under the issuer pay model. Therefore the question must be raised whether this has to be taken into account for the calculation of damages because some equivalence between liability and costs seems to be called for. In addition, ratings do not necessarily only lead to immediate financial loss on the part of the investor, as is the case if the issuer benefits from the flawed unjustifiably positive rating and receives a higher payment from the investor. Damages are different, when it comes to transactions in the secondary market which are influenced by flawed ratings. In these latter cases, the financial loss of the acquirer is compensated by the gain in the security price for the seller, so that the damage can be looked at as a matter of redistribution rather than an actual loss of resources. 72 Therefore one may wonder whether to take into account these flawed ratings that from a macroeconomic point of view have not lead to a loss of value. It is true that the latter may result from the misallocation of capital and the deterioration of capital market integrity. 73 These losses are, however, hardly quantifiable and therefore it seems unjustifiable to put them on one level with a loss of resources because overdeterrence may result.
2.
Limits to Immunity In light of these dangers of excessive liability, the privity limitations common in a lot of legal systems seem plausible. 74 At first sight the same may hold true for the required proof of causation or reliance. At the same time, as has been seen at the example of the German case law on investor reliance, these requirements can eliminate liability altogether. Therefore a less onerous burden of proof may be justified. The general application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, however, may extend liability without reasonable bounds, even though capital market integrity may lie within the protective aim of the civil liability regime, as stated above. In addition, one may find this standard increasingly unconvincing, considering the growing evidence of systematic deviation of investor behaviour from the rationality hypothesis. These objections can, however, be mitigated to a certain degree, if the recoverable damages are restricted to the excess amount the investor paid, but do not include restitution after total loss of the investment. 75 Under this approach the causation issue mixes with aspects of liability caps which for purposes of analytical clarity shall be treated separately.
B.
Liability Caps Another important parameter to arrive at a differentiated adjustment of liability in the rating sector could be the introduction of liability caps. At first sight one could consider to limit the damages eligible for compensation to the financial loss suffered by the investors in the primary market, whereas the loss resulting from redistribution in the secondary market would not have to be compensated. Overall this would allow a cap in the amount of the losses sustained on balance by the investment community. 76 The implementation of this proposal is confronted with insurmountable difficulties because the loss would have to be claimed collectively by the investment community. 77 Alternatively, one could also look at the loss of the issuer as a cap. This solution seems questionable, though, because the issuer's interests are contrary to the investors' with regard to the rating. Countervailing incentive effects would result and what would seem to be a loss for the investor, would be a contractually agreed performance with regard to the issuer.
In light of these difficulties of loss assessment and the dangers of excessive liability it seems plausible to try to tie the amount of damages to the amount of fees earned by the agencies. There has been a proposal to implement an earnings-based cap on liability and limit financial liability to cases of gross negligence. 78 Another proposal forwarded by John Coffee is based on a modified form of strict liability for rating agencies that would cap obligations at a multiple of annual revenues. 79 Another proposal calculates on the basis of a percentage of damages. 80 The common flaw of these proposals lies in the arbitrariness of the determination of the cap they rely on.
If one considers the specific liability case in question, it appears plausible to look at the fees earned from the individual issue because it would be exaggerated to hold rating agencies liable for the full value of the issues they rate on a regular basis. The volume of issues rated by rating agencies goes far beyond the fees they earn. Considering the enormous harm to the capital market they can cause, higher liability caps may still be justified in cases of gross negligence or recklessness as they have become evident from the email correspondence published in the Summary Report of the Securities Exchange Commission in 2008. 81 On the other hand, in day-to-day business damages in cases of simple negligence should not exceed the total fee. In fact, one might consider a cap based on the idea to disgorge the profits of the rating agency in these cases in order to avoid over-deterrence. There may still be the argument that this would lead to underdeterrence because such a cap is too low. If rating agencies, however, risk to lose entire fees for simple negligence, they will be more diligent, considering their high revenue generated from rating structured finance.
The concept of disgorgement of profits seems to be a suitable basis to deal with the danger of excessive liability for a number of reasons. First of all, it is a well-known legal instrument of ex ante behaviour control in US regulation of insider trading 83 and in German antitrust 84 . Section 16(b) of the US Securities Exchange Act permits the issuer (or a shareholder on its behalf) to recover all profits received by statutory insiders from any purchase and sale or sale and purchase of the issuer's equity securities within a sixmonth period without proof of actual use or intent to use inside information. 85 This shows how such a legal remedy may ease the burden of proof for causation and facilitate the determination of damages. 86 It is true, though, that the problems of more serious cases of false and misleading conduct may not adequately be dealt with and under-deterrence may result. Therefore some differentiation is in order that is missing in Art. 35a of the Amendment of the EU Rating Regulation as adopted by the European Parliament. It seems that the liability issue is far from being settled yet for an optimal liability concept to be legislated.
V. Summary
Under most legal systems contractual liability of rating agencies is limited by doctrinal The distinction between an actual loss in resources in the primary market and a loss resulting from redistribution in the secondary market may lead to a more differentiated analysis of the liability question. Facilitations to prove in favour of the investor such as the fraud on the market theory may help to overcome the insurmountable difficulties of proof relating to causation, but raise analytical concerns. Liability caps based on the concept of disgorgement of profits of the rating agencies may help to strike an adequate balance between the danger of macroeconomic harm created by reckless rating agencies and the threat of a market freeze resulting from over-deterrence.
